Dynamic Games and Applications: Second Special Issue on Population Games: Introduction by Broom, M. et al.
Broom, M., Krivan, V. & Riedel, F. (2015). Dynamic Games and Applications: Second Special Issue 
on Population Games: Introduction. Dynamic Games and Applications, 5(2), pp. 155-156. doi: 
10.1007/s13235-015-0153-3 
City Research Online
Original citation: Broom, M., Krivan, V. & Riedel, F. (2015). Dynamic Games and Applications: 
Second Special Issue on Population Games: Introduction. Dynamic Games and Applications, 5(2), 
pp. 155-156. doi: 10.1007/s13235-015-0153-3 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12572/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Dynamic Games and Applications: Second special Issue on Pop-
ulation Games - Introduction
Mark Broom, Vlastimil Krivan and Frank Riedel - editors.
This is the second special issue on Population Games, following the Decem-
ber 2014 issue. In this issue we continue the theme from the December issue,
but focus on different aspects.
An important extension of classical theory is the analysis of games with a
continuous strategy set. The sex ratio game, for instance, contains a contin-
uum of strategies, although these are in effect just probabilistic weights of
pure strategies. Many relevant games, e.g. Bayesian games, lead naturally
to rich strategy sets which one frequently describes by real parameters. In
general we need to be able to model cases where an arbitrarily large number
of strategies are available. This theory has been extended in a number of
ways, and is the subject of several papers within this special issue. Ruijgrok
and Ruijgrok extend the basic work of Riedel and collaborators on replicator
and other dynamics in games with a continuum of strategies. Growing in
importance over recent years since its introduction by Metz and collabora-
tors is the area of adaptive dynamics, which is a generalised methodology
to consider the evolution of continuous traits, where payoffs are nonlinear.
In Vutha and Golubitsky we see further development of the general theory
of adaptive dynamics and in particular classifications of singular strategies.
Bernhard considers an adaptive-dynamics model of the classical handicap
principle from biological signalling of Amotz Zahavi.
Another important departure has been the consideration of games with some
underlying structure. Arieli considers a congestion game on a network where
levied taxes influence behaviour. Games involving structure often include
finite populations, which necessitates the use of stochastic models, as we see
in the work of Kroumi and Lessard, which models the evolution of coopera-
tion in such a situation. Stochastics comes into population models in other
ways too. For example Cannings considers a classical model with repeated
mutations and shows long term stochastic patterns even in models that are
of the original matrix-game type.
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In summary, the modelling of populations using game theory is expanding
in a number of important directions, and we hope that our double special
issue of Dynamic Games and its Applications will be a useful resource to all
those who are interested in evolutionary game theory.
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